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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Martin Edmo Ish appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily dismissing
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  On appeal, Mr. Ish contends that the district
court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with regard to
one of Mr. Ish’s claims, the evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issues of material
fact as to whether counsel was ineffective.
In his post-conviction petition, Mr. Ish asserted that his defense counsel was
ineffective for requesting a jury instruction that misstated the law and lowered the
State’s burden of proof with regard to his possession of a controlled substance charge.
Because the requested jury instruction was given and the jury convicted Mr. Ish of
possession of a controlled substance, Mr. Ish has shown defense counsel’s error was
prejudicial.
The petition was summarily dismissed by the district court without an evidentiary
hearing.  The district court held that the instruction was correct and that Cootz v. State,
129 Idaho 360 (1996) precluded Mr. Ish from claiming that the jury instructions were
incorrect through post-conviction proceedings.  However, such was error as Idaho
precedent allows this claim to be pursued in post-conviction and the appellate courts
have found deficient performance by counsel in several cases where the jury was
erroneously instructed.  Therefore, the district court erred by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim.
Although the State conceded in its Respondent’s Brief that the jury instruction
was erroneous based on controlling precedent, it claimed that Mr. Ish did not show
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prejudice resulted from the erroneous jury instruction.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.2.)  This
Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that Mr. Ish failed to show
error in the district  court’s  dismissal  of  his claim for  failing to present a viable claim of
prejudice.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Ish’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE




The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Ish’s Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Ish’s post-conviction claim that the
district court’s jury instruction was erroneous and his counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the erroneous instruction.  The district court found that the instruction was
correct, that a claim of erroneous jury instructions may not be raised in post-conviction
pursuant to Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996), and that Mr. Ish had not established
prejudice or how the outcome would have been altered.  However, the jury instruction
was erroneous, the facts of Cootz v. State are distinguishable, and Mr. Ish presented
prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this issue and
demonstrated a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the
trial would have been different.  As such, Mr. Ish certainly should have been allowed an
evidentiary hearing on the claim, and the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his post-conviction petition in its entirety.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State conceded that the instruction was erroneous,
but asserted that Mr. Ish did not show he was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.4.)  “The evidence showed he possessed methamphetamine
both in a residual amount on a straw segment used to snort controlled substances and
in his urine.”  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-8.)  “The only reasonable inference from this
evidence is that Ish knew he was snorting methamphetamine or a controlled substance
through that straw.  There is no reasonable inference that Ish ‘truly believed’ the
substance he was snorting was a ‘harmless item[] such as sugar.’”  (Respondent’s Brief,
p.8.)  The State cited to State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240-242 (1999), for the holding,
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“the instructions would allow the jury to convict Blake if he knew there was some
substance under his seat and something in his wallet but truly, although negligently,
believed those substances to be harmless items such as sugar.”  (Respondent’s Brief,
p.7.)  The State then compared Mr. Ish’s case to that of the Blake Court’s holding,
calling the evidence that “Ish knew he possessed methamphetamine and not an
innocent substance was overwhelming” and alleging that “Ish presented no evidence or
theory establishing a ‘reasonable probability’ that the jury found his possession of
methamphetamine merely negligent.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)  However, this
argument fails.
Contrary to the State’s insinuations, in State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237 (1999), the
defendant did not claim that he believed the controlled substances he was alleged to
have possessed were harmless substances such as sugar. Blake, 133 Idaho at 239.
Further, the location of the substances was similar to the straw containing drug residue
in Mr. Ish’s pants pocket where, in Blake, “a sports wallet containing cocaine [was]
found in Blake’s underwear” and inside the car was “methamphetamine hidden inside a
hollowed-out book.” Id.  In Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the jury
instructions were erroneous as they allowed the jury to convict Mr. Blake using an
improper negligence standard, and did not dwell on whether Mr. Blake actually claimed
not to know what was inside the wallet in his underwear or inside the hollowed-out book.
Id. at 241.  The Blake Court did not require any showing that the defendant in that case
“truly believed” he was in possession of a harmless substance such as sugar; thus,
Mr. Ish was not required to make any such showing in order to demonstrate that he was
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prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of his counsel in requesting an erroneous jury
instruction.
Additionally, the State’s argument ignores completely Officer Eric Miller’s trial
testimony that Mr. Ish told him it had been a couple of months since he had used
methamphetamine.  (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.9-16.)  This information, combined with the fact
that it was residue in the straw1 calls into question whether Mr. Ish knew he possessed
traces of methamphetamine in the straw found in his pocket.  Regardless of whether
methamphetamine was found in his urine (Trial Tr., p.166, L.23 – p.167, L.3; State’s
Trial Exhibit 3), Mr. Ish could have obtained a straw with methamphetamine residue that
he was not aware of and/or could not even see.2  Had an evidentiary hearing been
conducted, Mr. Ish would have established that the State’s possession case suffered
from a lack of direct evidence that Mr. Ish knew there was methamphetamine residue in
the straw.
At trial, the State proceeded on the theory that Mr. Ish possessed
methamphetamine residue in the straw found in his pocket.  (Trial Tr., p.250, Ls.9-23.)
The State argues that Mr. Ish possessed both the methamphetamine in the straw and
the methamphetamine in his urine (Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-8); however, this argument
is unavailing for two reasons:  (1) Mr. Ish was charged with possessing the
methamphetamine residue found in the straw and not for the presence of
1 Mr. Ish refers this Court to the discussion of residue and the diminishment of the
inference of knowledge and control in a residue case he made in his initial Appellant’s
Brief, pp.18-19.
2 In fact, the forensic scientist who tested the straw said she “couldn’t really see if there
was anything inside of it or not.”  (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.23-25.)  This contradicted Officer
Miller’s testimony that he saw “white powdery residue on the inside of the straw tube.”
(Trial Tr., p.225, Ls.16-18.)
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methamphetamine in his urine; and (2) although the jury heard that Mr. Ish’s urine
contained, inter alia, methamphetamine, there was no testimony as to how long
methamphetamine takes to dissipate from urine once it has been ingested.  (Trial
Tr., p.164, L.17 – p.209, L.5.)  Mr. Ish did not admit to having recently possessed or
consumed methamphetamine, and in fact he said it had been a couple of months since
he had last used it, and there was no evidence as to whether the positive
methamphetamine result on his urine could have been caused by the
methamphetamine he admitted to ingesting several months earlier.  (Trial Tr., p.139,
Ls.13-16.)  It is because of these facts that the use of the negligence standard becomes
problematic and prejudicial to Mr. Ish’s case.
Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime requiring that the
defendant knowingly possess the substance. State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,
926 (1993).  The Idaho Court of Appeals in Stefani noted that, “[t]he purpose of the
intent element in the definition of a possession offense is to separate innocent,
accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal behavior.” Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704.
Here, the State charged Mr. Ish with possessing methamphetamine in violation of
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1).  (R.39487, p.37.)  The pattern Idaho criminal jury
instruction (ICJI) for possession of a controlled substance provides that “[i]n order for
the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, the state must
prove each of the following: . . . the defendant either knew it was [name of substance] or
believed it was a controlled substance.”  (ICJI 403.)  Therefore, it was the State’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ish knew it was methamphetamine
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or believed it was a controlled substance.  Under this instruction, the jury could not
convict Mr. Ish if it found he did not know it was methamphetamine or some other
controlled substance—even if the jurors believed he should have known it was
methamphetamine or some other controlled substance.
Nonetheless, the district court instructed the jury as follows regarding the
knowledge requirement:
4. the defendant knew or should have known it was
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance.
(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.15-23 (emphasis added).)  Thus, the district court’s instruction
asked the jury to apply the incorrect legal standard to establish the element of
knowledge and thereby lowered the State’s burden of proof.  The jury was left with the
impression that it could convict Mr. Ish even if it found that he did not realize there was
methamphetamine or another controlled substance inside the straw, but “should have
known” what was in the straw.  The jurors could reasonably have concluded that they
were directed to find Mr. Ish guilty of possession of a controlled substance without
finding that he knew what was in the straw.
In Mr. Ish’s case, where his counsel requested an erroneous jury instruction that
had been determined erroneous by Idaho case law as far back as 1999, this constituted
deficient performance and controlling precedent allows such a claim to be raised in a
post-conviction case.  Thus, the district court’s holding that the instruction was a correct
statement of the law was erroneous.
Furthermore, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings.  Because of the error, the jury was left with the impression that it
could convict Mr. Ish even if it found that he did not know what, if anything, was in the
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straw.  This is particularly important in Mr. Ish’s case, where the arresting officer
testified that Mr. Ish said he had not used methamphetamine for several months and the
jury was not informed of how long urine would continue to test positive for a substance.
Had the jury been properly instructed, there is a reasonable probability it would not have
convicted Mr. Ish of the offense.
Thus, the district court’s dismissal of all of Mr. Ish’s post-conviction claims was
error.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ish respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal of his
post-conviction petition with respect to the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective
for requesting an erroneous jury instruction which lowered the State’s burden of proof at
trial, and remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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